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I. INTRODUCTION

Concerned about the realization of the European Market,
lobbyists are seeking to modify the decisions made in Brussels. The
lobbying phenomenon has involved many controversial issues that
will be resolved during the spring of 1992.
The United States has been familiar with the concept of
lobbying for many decades, but such familiarity is not the case in
Europe. As the following anecdote demonstrates, the practice of
lobbying has not always been exclusive to the Americans. A
French lobbyist, the Comte de Vergennes, Minister of Foreign
Affairs under Louis XVI, visited Washington D.C. in 1793 and
influenced Congress to grant a refund for the armaments that
France had delivered to the United States during the Revolutionary
War. Lobbying had been practiced for many years on both the
American and European continents; but Europe has never regulated
methods, proceedings, or codes of conduct for lobbyists.
The fact that none of the European countries have regulated
lobbyist activity does not mean that these countries are not
concerned about these purveyors of influence. The lobbies of the
European Parliament in Strasbourg, Capitol Hill in Washington
D.C., and even the California State Capitol specialize in influencing
legislative and administrative action.
The term "lobbying" is generally understood to mean bringing
positive influence to bear on lawmakers to advance a given
interest.' In recent years, lobbying has become an accepted part of
the European Economic Community's (EEC) legislative process,
although the methods and approaches required differ considerably
from those employed in national areas. With the advent of 1992,
the European Community (EC) is moving rapidly towards the
realization of the Single Market. Implementation of EC '92 goals
started slowly, but by late 1991 the process had become the
principal topic of discussion in capitols and boardrooms across
Europe.

1.
FAI POLITICAL PRACTICES COMM*N, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, INFORMATION MANUAL ON
LOBBYING DIsCLosu PROVISIONS OF THE PoLuIcAL REFORM ACT (1990).
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EC '92 finally had gathered the critical mass needed to attract
and hold public attention. Even if the EC government misses the
December 31, 1992 deadline for enactment of all proposals for
unifying western Europe, the process of unification will be
irreversible because the goals of EC '92 are not new.2
Many companies, both within and outside the EC, now
understand the need to protect and advance their interests in the
formative stages of the law-making process, that is, while
legislation is being drafted and debated. Accordingly, companies
need to communicate their interests to EC decision-makers
effectively, and to take the initiative in proposing alterations or
additions to putative legislation. Therefore, although lobbying of
politicians and lawmakers may not be a new idea, recently it
appears to have assumed more importance within the EC. Even
after the rules for the Single Market have been promulgated, many
details will need to be addressed by the EC decision-making
bodies. For this reason, many people in Brussels expect that
lobbying will continue as a valuable, and often necessary, activity.3
Are consultants and representatives of organizations continuing
to practice lobbying activities without any safety net, with no
regulation, code of conduct, or code of business ethics? This issue
has been raised for several years,4 but remained unanswered until
1991. This article discusses whether it is finally necessary to
regulate the so-called European "merchants of influence."

2.
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957, states as the EC's primary goals, "[A]
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase
in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between the States
belonging to it." TREATY EsTABuSHiNG THE BuROPEAN EcoNoMZc COmUNiy [EEC TREATY] art.
2.
3.
Interview with Florence Maisel-Mouterde, Associate Director of INTEREL, Public Affairs
and Communication Institutionnelle, in Paris, France (Oct. 9,1991).
4.
Written Question No. 2325/84 to the Commission: Community Lobbyists, lens Peter,
Rainbow Group (Mar. 18, 1985); Written Question No. 620/85 to the Commission:Lobbyists, Dieter
Rogalla, Socialist Group (Dec. 31, 1985).
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II. A PRACTICE NOT ACCEPTD
Some contend that the term "lobbyist" necessarily connotes
United States. Perhaps this association is because it was in America
that pressure groups gained respectability after starting from less
than respected origins; and a general view that the vast majority of
lobbying that occurs in the world takes place in Washington D.C.
Today, lobbyists have invaded all parts of the world.'
A. Lobbying Throughout the World
From North to South, East to West, the internationalization of
exchanges, the quest for capital to invest, and the development of
economies is evident. Despite their uniformity of purpose, the
methods used by lobbyists are different.
In the vast majority of EC-member state parliaments, there are
no rules or provisions governing the activities of lobbyists. This is
true of the parliaments of Belgium, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Portugal, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the
German Bundestag.6 In the Italian Chamber of Deputies, five bills
aimed at recognizing and regulating professional public relations
activities have been tabled. 7
There are no specific rules governing the organization and
activities of lobbyists in the Danish Parliament (Folketing), or the
French National Assembly." Nevertheless, both chambers give de
facto recognition, and certain parliamentary privileges, to such
groups.' In the Folketing, delegations or representatives of
concerned organizations may be admitted to parliamentary
committees under the following conditions: (1) members of the
delegation must belong to the organization which has submitted a

5.

(1991).
6.
(available
7.
8.
9.
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LOBBIES EN F ANCE 163

Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag, Annex I%Doc. No. DG JUR% PROM (June 1991)
at Library of the European Parliament, Luxembourg (noncirculating material)).
Id
Id.

Id.
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request to appear; and (2) the lobbyists are permitted to appear for
a maximum of fifteen minutes."°
There are no specific rules affecting lobbyists in the National
Assembly of the French Republic. Lobbyist access to the French
Parliament's office and meeting rooms is governed by general rules
of access.1 In general, arrangements are similar to those applied
in the European Parliament and political groups which freely
decide who to receive and with whom to consult. However, access
to, and movement within, the premises of the National Assembly
is regulated by a 2general directive of the Assembly which specifies
who may enter.'
Although no explicit reference is made to lobbyist activities,
Switzerland and Luxembourg are beginning to formulate rules
which would govern lobbyists' activities. In Switzerland, lobbyists
actually exercise their power more on the international level than
on the national level. European influence groups are in Brussels to
learn what will occur during 1992, but they are also in Washington
D.C., where they do not hesitate to use the services of professional
lobbyists from either Switzerland or the United States to obtain the
ends they seek. Large companies headquartered in Switzerland have
lobbyists in all parts of the world, which gives them the
opportunity to be present wherever decisions which may affect
them are being made. Functioning nationally, Swiss companies do
not hesitate to hire prestigious foreign personalities to lobby on
their behalf. The Swiss multinational corporations are highly
efficient at influencing decisions, anywhere in the world, which
may affect their business.
The Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies has enacted rules
governing lobbyist activities. Rule 25(1) of the new Rules of
Procedure refers to extra-parliamentary cooperation, and makes
provisions for a committee to receive and hear the opinion of extraparliamentary persons and organizations, to request information or
documentation, and to accept or request extra-parliamentary

10.
11.
12.

Id
General Directive of the French National Assembly, art 26.
Id.
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cooperation when considering a bill. Such consultations must relate
to the subject under consideration by the committee and, following
an assessment of the need for consultation, must be approved by an
absolute majority of its members."
Precise and systematic rules regulating lobbying exist only in
Australia, Canada, and the German Bundestag.1 4 Observation of
what Canada and Australia are doing to regulate lobbying efforts
will help to understand the future evolution of English lobbying
regulation. In these two past colonies of the British Empire,
lobbyists are accepted, but their activities are restricted.15
Lobbyists in both Canada and Australia must be registered. 6
Currently, more strict regulations are in the process of being
17
drafted.
In the German Bundestag, each year a public list is compiled,
including all associations, organizations, or undertakings which
wish to express their interests to the Bundestag or the federal
government."8 Entry onto this list is a precondition for
representatives of interest groups to be received by parliamentary
committees, or to be issued a pass admitting them to Parliament's
premises. The list must contain the following information: (1)
Name and location of the association or interest group; (2) the
composition of the group's board of directors and board of
management; (3) the group's sphere of interest; (4) the number of
members in the organization; (5) the names of the association's
appointed representatives; and (6) the address of the group or
association's office at the seat of the Bundestag and the federal
government.

20

Once an interest group has provided all the necessary
information to the corresponding services of the Bundestag, the

13.
Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies Rules of Procedure 25(1) (1991).
14.
Le Lobbying, Sport National Allemand, IE MONDE, Feb. 18, 1992 [hereinafter Le
Lobbying].
15.
See GItLiAMi, supra note 5, at 163.
16.
IC
17.
Id
18.
Le Lobbying, supra note 14.
19.
Id.
20.
Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag, Annex , Doc. No. DG JUR% PROM (June 1991).
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service may issue a pass on request. 2 1 The list does not entitle
lobbyists to be heard in hearings or before committees, or to be
issued a pass. Indeed, once a pass has been issued, it can be
declared invalid by the Bundestag. The invalidation of passes
remains entirely at the discretion of the corresponding office of the
House.22 The Bundestag and its committees can also invite
associations or experts who do not appear on the list to their
meetings when considered necessary.'
Rules governing the activities of lobbyists have a considerable
tradition in the United States. Therefore, it is imperative to
understand the lobbying arrangements used in that country before
examining the problems that the U.S. is facing due to lobbying
activities.

24

The three main laws which regulate lobbying at the federal
level are: the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, the Byrd
Amendment, and the Foreign Agents Registration Act. In addition
to this legislation, another consideration is the Senate and House
Rules on Gifts, Travel, Reimbursements, andHonoraria to members
of Congress, which might be described as an internal regulation on
ethics.'
The first of the federal laws, the Federal Regulation of
Lobbying Act, restricts the activities of pressure groups as they
pertain to the U.S. Congress. This statute lists those persons who
must register as lobbyists, and the information which they must
periodically supply, in a manner typical of the caustic approach to
such rules under Anglo-Saxon legal practice.26

Id
21.
Id
22.
Le Lobbying, supra note 14. The 1990 public list of the Bundestag was comprised of 1501
23.
associations. Id
See Serge Marti, Le Lobbying Social Nippon Aurait Atteint 400 Millions de Dollars en
24.
1991, LE MONDE, Dec. 10, 1991.
See DONALD H. HAIMER, WHEN GOVERNMES COME To WASINOTON (1974). These
25.
rules vary slightly for each of the chambers of Congress. Rather than laying down major obligations
for lobbyists, they are chiefly addressed to members of Congress, and apply equally to congressional
officials and employees. Id
Ia
26.
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In the U.S., lobbying is defined as any activity which involves
influencing or seeking to influence the legislative process through
direct contacts with members of Congress or their staff. According
to the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, lobbying comprises
four key elements: (1) legislative activity, (2) intention to influence
the legislative process, (3) intention to influence Congressional
members or their staff, and (4) direct communication with members
of Congress or their staff. An activity is not considered lobbying
27
where one of these features is lacking.
The Byrd Amendment sets forth restrictions and prohibitions on
the use of federal funds in lobbying activities. Further, it provides
new and more precise rules concerning expenditures incurred in
lobbying activities by persons receiving any type of federal grant
or funding.
The Foreign Agents Registration Act consists of a series of
registration obligations for any person wishing to act as a lobbyist
on behalf of a foreign national, and requires the submission of
periodic reports on their lobbying activities.'
The problems that the U.S. is experiencing from lobbyists'
efforts are voiced in congressional concern about the effects of
foreign influence on the U.S. government and the American public.
U.S. Senators have, therefore, proposed amendments to the Foreign
Agents Registration Act of 1938.29 The Act neither prohibits
representation of foreign interests in the U.S., nor prevents
dissemination of foreign propaganda." Since 1974, 47% of former
senior officials in the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
(USTR) have registered with the Justice Department31 as foreign
agents, or worked for firms that had so registered.3 2 "The Office
of the USTR has become almost a training ground for foreign

27.
Id
28.
See Phillip J. Perry, Recently ProposedReforms to the ForeignAgents RegistrationAct,
23 CORNELL INT'L LJ.133 (1990).
29.
Id
30.
1d
31.
See Nn= WKLY., Sept. 7, 1991.
32.
WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 1991, § 1, at A25 (statement of the Center For Public Integrity, a
new labor, business, and foundation-financed public-interest group in Washington D.C.).
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lobbyists." 33 Recently, however, attention has been focused on the
powerful Japanese lobby in Washington. "[T]here is no question
that lobbyists-and the Japanese lobbyists in particular-are having
34
an effect on politics and policy [in the United States]."
An examination of lobbying throughout the world would not be
complete without giving attention to those countries who are trying
to discover democracy: a prime example is Hungary. Because of its
trader traditions and its opening to western Europe, Hungary has
undergone precocious liberalization. After the Revolution of
1956, the Janos Kadar regime tried to accomplish a soft
normalization. Kadar was open to lobbyists because he knew that
Hungarians needed to find their way to a new job, or to give
communism the opportunity to survive, even if the population did
not want it.36 Lobbyist groups were recognized and they existed
even if no proper rules governed their activities.37 However, when
the economy worsened the lobbyists lost their power. In the early
1980s, a new type of lobbyist appeared with a new dream; to be
the preferred interlocutor of the huge investors from the capitalist
countries .3 For the Hungarian lobbyist, lobbying means
democracy.
B. Europe, Native Country of Lobbyists
The European Community tries to maintain a balance between
the Anglo-Saxon common and Latin civil legal traditions.
Regarding the practice of lobbying, however, there is no doubt
about the English influence. The Anglo-Saxon common law model
has more influence on this issue than the Latin civil law model.
A whole spectrum of people and organizations now lobby for
their clients in the EC. There are 500 European associations and

33.

L

34.

See JEFFREY H. BIRHAUM, LOBBYISTS AND YOU (1990).

35.
14746).
36.
37.
38.

Guy Sorman, 14 Triomphes du Liberalisme, L FIGARO DU SAMEIW, Jan. 18, 1992 (No.
Id
See GIULIANI, supra note 5, at 193.
Id. at 195.

The TransnationalLaeyeI Vol. 5
3000 lobbyists involved in the EC decision-making process. 9
Certainly these influence groups need to make themselves more
visible to members of the decision making bodies. The large
number of professional EC public affairs consultants now working
in this area is a testament to the extent to which organizations now
value active lobbying.4" Based mostly in Brussels, some lobbyists
have affiliated offices in other major cities. For example, there are
thirteen lobbyist firms registered with the Association Frangaise
des Conseils en Lobbying in Paris. 4' These consultants represent
a broad range of clients from national and international
corporations,42 to trade associations, charities, environmental
groups,43 and local government authorities. They provide a wide
range of information and advisory services. Lobbyists also assist in
identifying issues, developing strategic programs, managing media
relations, and making presentations to the EC."4 Not all
professional consultants provide the same range of services. Some
lobbyists may provide monitoring services, while others do not.45
In selecting a lobbyist or consultant, it is therefore necessary to
assess what type of services are called for, and then determine
whether a particular organization can provide those services.
Because the legislative procedure of the EC is complex, those
who wish to exercise influence within it should first understand the
system before they may effectively communicate their interests to
EC decision-makers.
1. Understandingthe System
A knowledge of the various channels through which proposed
laws pass, the bodies involved, and the time at which deliberations
occur, assist the lobbyist in determining when and where
39.

Interview with Florence Maisel-Mouterde, supra note 3.

40.

l

41.

THERRY LEFEBURF, LOBBY OR NOa To BE 161 (1991).

42.

Interview with Florence Maisel-Mouterde, supra note 3.

43.
CNIH de
44.
45.
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Interview with Olivier Bobille, Charge de Mission Affaires Europennes et du Bureau
Bruxelles, in Brussels, Belgium (Oct. 8, 1991).
Ic
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representations to EC officials should be made. Lobbyists also need
to be aware of the voting majorities required to pass legislation,
and time limits on their activities; both of which vary according to
the legislation involved and the procedure being used by the
system. The essential structure of the EC law-making system is one
in which the Commission proposes, the European Parliament
advises, and the Council decides. Supervising the activities of these
institutions and ensuring that they act within the scope of their
powers is the job of the European Parliament.46
a. The Commission
The Commission consists of seventeen officials, known as the
Commissioners, designated by the individual governments. The
Commission is the policy-initiating body; virtually all policy
decisions originate with the Commission. It initiates policy and
passes the recommended measures on to the Council of Ministers.
Proposals for new laws emanate from the Commission and are
drafted by members of the Directorate General responsible for the
policy area concerned.47
A positive exchange of opinions and information, before a
proposal is drafted and submitted to the Council, is viewed by
many lobbyists as highly beneficial.48 Dialogue at this point on
the possible effects of the proposal and alternative methods of
achieving objectives may reduce or obviate the need for future
49

activity.

b. The Council
The Council consists of the foreign ministers of the member
states. The ministers deliberate and decide on the measures

46.
See CHRISTIAN GAVALDA & GILBERT PARAN4 DRorr COMMUNAUTAIRE DES AFFAIRES
97 (1988).

47.
Id The Commission is internally divided into departments responsible for specific areas
such as agriculture, internal markets, social affairs, and transportation. Id
48.
See id at 90-91.
49.
Id
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recommended by the Commission, accepting or rejecting the
proposal. The Council is the principal law-making body of the EC,
altering or amending Commission proposals.5 0 Since the Council
determines what is to become law, and is comprised of memberstate representatives, it is also worthwhile to consider lobbying the
Council through national channels. 5'
c. The European Parliament
The European Parliament is composed of 518 members which
are directly elected to that position by the country they
represent.5" The formal opinion of the Parliament is required on
most proposals, before they can be adopted by the Council. Its
powers have been greatly strengthened by the cooperation
procedure for certain measures under the Single European Act.53
The role of the European Parliament remains largely
consultative except for its ability to control, within limits, certain
types of EC budgetary expenditures. The preparatory work for
plenary sessions is completed in eighteen specialized
committees.54 A proposal from the Commission is first referred to
one of the committees for a report and to others for an opinion.
The reporting committee then formally nominates a Rapporteur,"
chosen by the political parties."
In the committee, there is generally a first reading of a
preliminary paper from the Rapporteur, and a presentation of the
Commission's proposal. Once adopted, the committee's report is
5
placed on the agenda for a forthcoming sessionY.
The Parliament
generally meets in full session once a month in-Strasbourg, France.
The majority of legislative proposals under the Single European

50.
Ict
51.
GAVALDA & PARUANi, supra note 46, at 90-91.
52.
Id at 98.
53.
EEC TREATY.
54.
See GAVALDA & PAR/.U.ANi, supra note 46, at 98.
55.
Mr. Marc Galle of Belgium, member of the Socialist Party, is the Rapporteurin charge
of the regulation on lobbyists.
56.
See LEFf3URF, supra note 41, at 162.
57.
Id
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Act fall under the cooperation procedure: after giving its opinion
on the Commission proposal, the Parliament may modify its stance
before the Council of Ministers reaches a common position on the
proposal. This common position is returned to the Parliament for
a second reading.5" Because of its mainly consultative role, the
Parliament may have less significance for lobbyists than does the
Council.
The system of review and debate through the Council, the
European Parliament, and the committees which assist them, is
comprehensive. It is therefore essential that lobbying activities
occur at the optimal time in the process. Once a proposal has been
formally drafted by the Commission, it would be extremely
difficult to substantially alter it. Once a proposal has been accepted
by the Council, there may be little chance of changing what is to
become law.
2. Brussels: the Lobbies Under Pressure
The actions of lobbyists in Brussels and Strasbourg are different
than lobbyist actions in the individual member states. It is an
extremely different political world. "Brussels, [Belgium] is the
native country of lobbyists, they are everywhere. ' 5 9 But lobbyists
in Brussels are different from the lobbyists in the member states.
"They are European; that means fast, rich, organized, effective,
imaginative, and tenacious. ' 6°
Lobbying of the European Parliament has increased
considerably in the past decade." This increase has come not only
from commercial lobbyists, but also from single issue pressure
groups and other organizations.62 The concerns expressed by the
Parliament over representational activities in Brussels and
Strasbourg, arise from the practices of a small minority of

58.

Id

59.
JACQUELINE NONON & MbcmEL CLAMEN, L'EuRoPE Er SEs CoULoms, LOBBYING ET
LOBBYISTES 31 (1990).
60.
See GIUIAN, supra note 5, at 207.
61.
Id.
62.
Id
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professional and personal interest advisers who have abused the
facilities of the Parliament.6 3 Most lobbyists in Brussels and
Strasbourg stress their concern over such abuses, and express hope
that such abuse will not occur at the Commission or Council
levels. 6
Presently, the bulk of policy and legislative representation
concentrates on the Commission. However, the European
Parliament is constantly growing in significance to political
lobbyists and lobbying organizations.5
3. Resources, Strategies, and Tactics
Strategies and tactics are central to the achievement of group
purposes in EC lobbying. It must first be described how the interest
groups pursue their objectives; what strategies they use. Secondly,
what actions they take in fulfilling those strategies, specifically,
their tactics.
Lobbying involves communications, whether direct or indirect.
The intermediate objective of all interest groups is maximizing
their influence; to develop and improve their access to the decisionmaking bodies of the EC. 66 The general public, segments of the
media, and others, accord interest groups considerable
legitimacy.67 The lobbying tasks of interest groups, once having
gained access, are defined in terms of trying to convince and
persuade legislators. This means persuading the Commission,
Council, and Parliament that broader constituencies will be affected
by their particular decisions or actions." To accomplish this task

63.
See LErfBURE, supra note 41, at 168.
Letters from Peter Verhille, a representative of ACCESS (a London, England-based
64.
lobbying group), and .H. Lever, ConseilEuropeen de l'IndustrieChimique (Brussels, Belgium), to
the European Parliament Committee in charge of the lobbyists regulation, Committee on the Rules
of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities.
Id
65.
66.
Interview with Dennis 0. Flatt, Vice President and Legislative Representative of Kaiser
Foundation Health Plan, Inc., in Sacramento, California (Jan. 10, 1992).

67.
68.
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the direct approach, the personal presentation of a case, is widely
considered to be the most effective tactic for communication.69
The quality of the lobbyist, as well as the substance of the
information they carry, is important to successful lobbying.7"
Many lobbying organizations in Europe do not possess the
necessary resources to be effective. Nevertheless, they try to
properly assess each specific case before a decision-making body
of the EC, and appraise their available options.7" European
lobbyists maintain continuing relationships with EC officials and
understand that the approaches to the EC governing organizations
should not be made until the desired objectives have been precisely
72
determined.
Time is an important factor in determining not only when to
make approaches to the Commission, Council, and Parliament, but
also in deciding what approaches to pursue. First, a lobbyist should
be selective in whom to approach. The person confronted should
be someone closely involved in the formulation and evolution of
the matter under consideration." Second, representations should
be kept clear and framed within concise, constructive
presentations.' It is also advisable that the lobbyist be aware of
the individual sensitivities of those with whom they speak. An
aggressive stance may gain attention, but not obtain results.
National cultural mores and rules of conduct also play an important
role in affecting EC policy determinations.75
"To lobby the EC successfully, you have to get in early, and
'
stay in; be on the spot and base your positions on evidence." 76

69.
Interviews with Judith E. Wolen, Legislative Advocate, Associate of Frank Murphy, Jr.,
Attorney at Law; David C. Knight, Government Relations Director, Beneficial Management
Corporation of America; and Denny Samuel, Senior Representative California State Relations, the
Chevron Companies, in Sacramento, California (Jan. 13, 1992).
70.
Interview with George H. Cope, Jr., President of Aggregate Producers Association, in

Sacramento, California (Jan. 6, 1992).
71.
Id
72.
Id.
73.
See generally NONON & CLAmEN, supra note 59, at 169. Both authors are involved in the
EC decision-making process. They give advice to beginner lobbyists.

74.

Id

75.
76.

Id
Interview with Florence Maisel-Mouterde, supra note 3.
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There is, therefore, an investment of time and effort to be made.
"But the EC officials and the members of the European Parliament
are much more open to act on well-founded arguments than their
national counterparts. Euro-lobbying definitely pays-off.""

III. A CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
A. "Act Now or Suffer Later"7 8
In lobbying the European Parliament,79 it is not enough to put
forth general positions and hope that members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) and their assistants will translate them into
amendments, resolutions, or questions. Everything must be drafted
by the lobbyist. Therefore, it is important to know the practical
tips, and the channels for lobbying the Parliament.
1. Channels of Lobbying
Many organizations have found the European Parliament to be
the catalyst for introducing new policies, legislation, and, of course,
budget lines."0
The first stage of lobbying the EC is to contact the Rapporteur,
because if he accepts your position the battle is half won. Once the
81
draft report of the Rapporteur is circulated to the Committee,
the lobbyist must write to, and speak with, members of the
Secretariat, and Ordinators in the political parties. In practice, in
order for proposed amendments to stand a chance of being

77.
ad.
78.
Interview with Olivier Bobille, supra note 43 (translating Mrs. Edith Cresson's opinion
about lobbyists in Europe, Agir Pourne Pas Subir, Bruxelles, Mode dXemploi). Mrs. Cresson was the
Prime Minister of France until April 1, 1992, and was the Minister of European Affairs until 1991.
79.
Id. It is important to remember that EC decisions are amended, rejected, or approved by
national and political representations in the European Parliament. Id.
80.
Interview with Olivier Bobille, supra note 43 (explaining this assertion). Every effort is
being made to increase the budgetary powers of the Parliament and give it the power of the purse
that all legislative assemblies possess. Id.
81.
Id The preparatory work for a Plenary session is done in 18 specialized committees. The
proposal from the Commission is first referred to one or another of the committees for a report, and
to others for an opinion. kd
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accepted, they need the support of both the Socialist and the
European People Groups, which are the two largest political
affiliations. 2
The second stage is a reading of the proposal in the European
Parliament.83 The same process of examination is followed in
committee, and then in the plenary session, with a number of
options and strict time limits on the process. It is significantly more
difficult for the lobbyist to have any influence at this stage because
an absolute majority of members is required for an amendment to
be adopted."
Choosing the right channel can only be done on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis." Good lobbying depends on the proper
assessment of each specific case and appraising the available
options. Approaches to the EC should not be made until defined
objectives have been precisely determined together6 with a plan for
pushing the relevant request through the process.
2. PracticalTips for Lobbying
The gray booklet, 7 which lists the names and addresses of the
MEPs by committee and political group, is particularly useful to
the lobbyist. Another useful indicator of upcoming issues is an
internal publication, Work in Progress in Parliamentary
Committees, which announces not only the state of current work,
but what legislation is forecasted to be introduced in the other
institutions of the EC decision-making bodies.88

82.
Id The distribution by political group in January 1991 is as follows: The Socialist Group
has 180 members, the Group of the European People Party (Christian-Democratic Group) has 121
members. Ia

83.

Id

84.
Id
85.
Lumun, supra note 41, at 108 (explaining Nike's file: in 1988, a problem developed
with a Korean company over a restriction on the importation of sports shoes tb the EC; the

Parliament asked American lobbyists to defend the Korean company).
86.
87.
88.

Id
Available from the European Parliament, Luxembourg.
See La~sun, supra note 41, at 114-15.
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The itinerant nature of the Parliament, along with the
Secretariat in Luxembourg, and most committee meetings in
Brussels, and the plenary sessions in Strasbourg, poses a significant
problem for the lobbyist.3 9 It is best to deal with rapporteurs
before or after committee meetings in Brussels because they have
more time at their disposal. It is also very useful for a lobbyist to
attend public committee sessions in order to hear what is said by
whom, and thereby determine which committee member to contact
9
on any given issue. 0
When following up proposals at the European Parliament in
Strasbourg be aware that the building is a veritable fortress. Visits
must be arranged in advance, with an invitation from an MEP, in
order to obtain a pass to get into the building." Once allowed to
enter the Parliament, one can roam quite freely. It is, however, very
difficult to talk to people in Strasbourg for any length of time. It
is, rather, the place to contact several people, for short periods of
time, on several issues. This can be done from the phone at the
desk near the entrance.'
B. The European Parliament: Should Lobbying Be Regulated?
On May 24, 1991, Mr. Enrique Baron Crespo, President of the
European Parliament, asked the Committee on the Rules of
Procedure to consider a request from the Enlarged Bureau to
submit proposals for drawing up a code of conduct, and a public
register for the lobbyists accredited by Parliament.93
On June 21, 1991, the Committee appointed its Chairman, Marc
Galle, Rapporteur on the subject of lobbyist regulation. On
September 18 and 19, 1991, the Committee decided to hold a
public hearing in connection with the preparation of the report. The

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
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hearing was held in Brussels in the course of the committee
meetings of January 22 and 23, 1992.'
At the end of 1991, the Committee on the Rules of Procedure,
the Verification of Credentials and Immunities, received letters
from representatives of organizations wishing to take part in the
public hearing.95 Invitations to participate in the hearing were
extended to six persons who had made themselves known to the
Committee Secretariat.96 They were chosen because they had the
widest representational mandate possible, covering several member
States. A member of the U.S. Congress was also invited but did not
attend. 97
The framework of the hearing in January 1992 was a
questionnaire submitted by the Rapporteur,Mr. Marc Galle, to the
Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of
Credentials and Immunities. 9 This questionnaire contained six
questions which each of the guests answered.99 They also
submitted the positions of lobbyists in the hope that this would
assist in the Committee's deliberations. 100
Questions Asked at the Public Hearing
Question 1. Should Parliamentconfine itself to drawing up a
body of rules concerning itself alone, or should it work towards
introducingCommunity legislation on the representationof interest
groups to all of the EC institutions?
Most of those who answered this question were in favor of a
"body of rules concerning [lobbying in the] the European

94.

Ia

95.
Telephone Interview with Philippe Ventujol, Director General des Commissions et
Delegations,DG2 DirectionA, Commission Politique (Feb. 27, 1992).
96.
ML
97.
AL

98.

Id.

99.
Doe. ENXCMN1I5663, PE 153.280 (1991) (available at the Library of the European
Parliament, Luxembourg).
100.
The letters from the representatives of organizations wishing to take part in the hearing
have been published on December 2, 1991 by the European Parliament. PE 154-304/add; Doe.
EN/CMI120151 (available in the Library of the European Parliament, Luxembourg).
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Parliament itself... 1 However, there is a flaw in seeking to
control those who attempt to influence the Parliament, but not those
who seek to influence the EC's other institutions, especially the
Commission. President Jacques Delors'o° stated in January 1991
that "the Commission will not adopt any kind of rules on the
subject matter [of lobbying]."' 3 In this respect, the European
Parliament should provide a lead for the other European
institutions. The rules it adopts could well serve as a model for the
other EC policy making institutions.
Question 2. As to the definition of the concept of representation
of special interests: What activities and persons would be
concerned in the rules on representation of interests? What,
accordingly, should the criteriabe for lobbyist accreditationto the
Parliament?
Throughout the world those parliaments which have addressed
the question of determining what constitutes lobbying have found
it difficult to define the activity. In 1988, a Report on the
Registration of Lobbyists by the Association of Secretaries General
of Parliaments noted that none of the national parliaments of the
EC member states had a precise definition of "lobbyist" in official
use. Only the Bundestag had a registration system, adopted in 1972
which is now part of their Rules of Procedure."
10 5
Based on the comments made during the January hearings,
the twenty-five members of the Parliament's Rules Committee had
a key problem to resolve before taking any action requiring

101.
Those answering in favor were the lobbyist groups: ICL, FEP, Dutaret La Giraudlere
Larroze, CEFIC, and CNPF.
102.
Jacques Delors has been the President of the EC Commission since January 6, 1985. He
was previously the French Minister of Economy and Finance from 1981 to 1983. He also served the
French government as the Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs and the Budget in 1983 to
1984. In 1979, he was elected to the European Parliament where he chaired the Parliament's
Economic and Monetary Committee. Mr. Delors can claim considerable credit for reviving the
European Community in the 1980s after the stagnation of the 1970s.
103.
Answer from Jacques Delors and Cardozo E. Cunha to the Written Question from M.
Metten, Nos. 833/89 and 834/89, O.J. (C 117) (Jan. 24, 1991).
104.
Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag, Annex II,
Doc. No. DG JUR% PROWI (June 1991).
105.
Telephone Interview with Marc Galle of Belgium, member of the Socialist Party, the
Rapporteurin charge of the regulation on lobbyists (Feb. 27, 1992).
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registration, or compliance with a code of conduct, namely, how to
define a lobbyist. Rules restricting the access of registered lobbyists
to the Parliament will be extremely difficult to enforce because of
this definitional problem.10 6 However, some MEPs felt that it
would benefit the Parliament "to know exactly which lobbyists are
representing which interests."" The definition of the term
"representation of interests" had been suggested in one response
to the questionnaire. "It could include personal appearances in the
parliamentary buildings, meeting in other places, invitations to
dinner or other events. Also included could be a range of ways of
communicating, including phone, fax, letters, video and special
presentations." 1 8
The following answers to questions three, four, five, and six,
were given almost unanimously by all the groups in attendance at
the hearing. There was no vigorous opposition to these four
questions.
Question 3. What should be the accreditation procedure?
Should it be confined to listing the approved representativesin a
register,or should a specific accreditationunit be set up within the
framework of the Committee on the Rules and Procedurewith the
task of verifying fulfillment of the conditions required for
registration?
It was recommended that the accreditation be regulated by a
specific accreditation unit set up within the framework of the
Committee on the Rules and Procedure. This unit would define the
conditions for the registration of representatives and determine
whether or not representatives fulfill these conditions."
The proposed accreditation unit would be responsible for the
publication of approved representatives in a register which would
be updated and reissued every six months. This register would list
the names and addresses of approved representatives, the names of

106.
lId
107.
Interview with Paul Benhaoum, Chargi de Mission de Mr. J.L Borloo, Mayor of
Valenciennes City, in Valenciennes,France (Oct. 7, 1991).
108.
Answer by Fred Tuckman, Doc. EN/CM1 18767, PB 154.303 (Dee. 5, 1991).
109.
Telephone Interview with Philippe Ventujol, supra note 95.
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their clients and their places of business, and the issues or matters
upon which their lobbying activity is taking place. The
accreditation unit must ensure that the register clearly states who
is lobbying the European Parliament, and on what issue. 1 °
An accreditation system based on the following criteria has also
been proposed: 1 . (1) A requirement for MEPs to declare all
assistants and administrative staff employed by them or using their
facilities. The staff will be registered, and the register made
available for public inspection; (2) considerable tightening of
security at entrances to, and within, the European Parliament
buildings to ensure that only those with an appropriate pass use
European Parliament facilities is the most important requirement;
(3) the panel should be drawn exclusively from EC institutions
the Parliament, the
with two representatives each from
12
Commission, and the Council Bureau.1
Others present on January 22 and 23, 1992, however, spoke in
favor of a minimum of formality, a mere register of lobbyists
rather that the creation of an investigatory committee." 3
Question 4. As to the effects of registration:Should the benefits
be limited to obtaining a laissez-passer for the Institutions'
premises? Should the representativesbe expected in return to fulfill
certain requirements, e.g., to submit a regular statement of the

activities?
If the registration of representatives to the European Parliament
is indispensable those persons should have access to the premises
of the European Parliament on the basis of a permanent carte
d'acces n 4 The Public Policy Europe Group added in relation to
a declaration of activities, a serious concern of any possible
requirement to declare clients." 5 A number of firms have clients
who insist on their advisers signing confidential nondisclosure

110.

IM.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Public Policy Europe Group (a lobbyist group).
Id
Id
Interview with Paul Benhaoum, supra note 107.
Answerby Public Policy Europe Group, Doc. ENICNI1 18767, PE 154.303 (Dec. 5,1991).
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agreements, which prohibit them from disclosing to outsiders any
details of their relationships with those organizations.' 16 There is
concern that a requirement to list clients could cause some
organizations to end the relationships with their advisers. Public
Policy Europe Group mentioned that "some organizations that are
already considering the drafting of bogus contracts under which
political consulting services would be provided by them through a
third party, such as their advertising agents, in order to avoid
explicit disclosure.""' 7
Question 5. Should the different types of activities carriedout
by the representativesbe defined on a limitative basis?
Most of the answers focused on the general social and ethical
principles of due respect, pertinence, courtesy, and competence. 1 '
There is no need, indeed it would be democratically incorrect, to
restrict lobbying activities. MEPs and others can always choose not
to receive representatives, or to reject the advice of those they do
receive."'
Question 6. Should consideration be given to drawing up a
code of conductfor the members and officials having contacts with
the special interest representatives?
It was recommended by most of the questionnaire respondents
that the Committee on Rules and Procedure give consideration to
drawing up a code of conduct for MEPs, their staff, and officials
of the Parliament that have contacts with the accredited
representatives of present interests. It was recommended that the
Committee pay particular attention to the following issues: 2 ' (1)
Ensure that MEPs orally declare their financial, professional, and
other relevant interests, before speaking in Parliament or in one of
its bodies; (2) MEPs' staff and any family members who may have

116.
Id
117.
Id
118.
Answer by FederationBancairede la Communaute Europlenne.
119.
Id
120.
External Affairs and Communications (ICL) and Conseil Europeen Des Fabricantsdu
Sucre (lobbyist groups).
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access to the European Parliament and other EC institutions be
permitted use of offices, phones, and facilities, and have access to
papers, only in a privileged manner."'
It was mentioned by the National Council for Voluntary
Organization in London,1 2 in August 1991, that a distinction
must be made between a code of conduct for profit making, and
nonprofit making bodies. A code should be drawn up in
conjunction with representatives of lobbyists.
III. CONCLUSION

Many Europeans who have not directly observed the EC's
policy-making institutions in operation will steadfastly deny that
lobbying occurs in Brussels or in the national capitals of the EC
member states. In contrast to the U.S. Congress, few of the national
parliaments of the EC member states regulate lobby groups'
activities. Only the Bundestag has a complete set of rules. The
United Kingdom, France, and Denmark have only sketchy
regulations.
The European Parliament under great pressure from lobbyists
recognizes the need to exchange information with these outside
sources but with some regulation on lobby groups' access to the
European Parliament's facilities, data bases, and working
groups."1 Lobbying is no longer a uniquely American
phenomenon. There is a European style of lobbying. Its style is
derived partly from the EC's complex institutional structure, and
partly from the distinctive culture of legislative advocacy in
Europe.12 4 "Many non-EEC companies, trade associations and
even governments refuse to believe that Community Institutions
can be lobbied successfully." 1 '25

121.
Md
122.
The Voluntary Sector Parliamentary Workers Group represents the interests of lobbyists
and others from the social economy working with politicians domestically and internationally.
123.
See James N. Gardner, Lobbying, EuropeanStyle, EUROPE MAoAmv, Nov. 1991, at 30.
124.
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Id
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In actuality, members of the European Parliament and lobbyists
depend on each other for their survival. This interdependence can
give rise to practical problems. For this reason, the Parliament has
commissioned a study from Belgium Socialist MEP, Marc Galle,
on the question of regulating lobbyists. At the public hearing on
regulating lobbyist activities of January 1992 held by the
Parliamentary Committee on Rules and Procedure, there was no
significant opposition to a potential lobbyist registration
requirement6 so long as no complicated procedures were
12
involved.
Some of those present at the hearing spoke in favor of the
creation of an independent organization for professional lobbyists
with an accreditation committee. Marc Galle favored locating this
organization outside the Parliament. He also suggested a new press
center in Strasbourg, as a place where MEPs and lobbyists could
obtain information without having to find their way through the
maze of corridors in the Parliament building. Another socialist
MEP, Alman Metten of the Netherlands, protested against the lack
of organization and of the exponential growth of lobbyist groups in
Brussels.
A more serious concern is that many Parliament employees also
work for lobbyist groups, and it is becoming difficult to tell "who
is working for whom." '127 "If they are European, that's alright.
If they are foreigners . . .that's a good question, we did not
envisage this issue. 12' At the end of March 1992, Mr. Galle and
Philippe Ventujol would like to see, at the very least, a definitive
draft of a lobbying regulation. "If everything works out with the
'
Commission, we may see the end of the tunnel in May, 1992. 129
Every mendicant must be aware of this new cncern. Those
who are most knowledgeable about the act of political persuasion

126.
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Telephone Interview with Marc Galle, supra note 105.
Interview with Olivier Bobille, supra note 43.
Telephone Interview with Philippe Ventujol, supra note 95. Mr. Ventujol is working on

the lobbyist regulation at the European Parliament. Mr. Ventujol added that the first priority will be
given to a European group of interest before any foreign agents of influence, but if a lobbyist from
a foreign country wants to prowl at the European Parliament he can do it if he fulfills the
requirements.
129.
Id
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must know that prowling the European Parliament has become a
new profession En Vogue. "In comparing lobbyists to predators,
lobbyists are not painted as badly. But if I compare the lobbyists
to geishas, I am apparently referring to their skill at entertaining
rich and powerful men, creating an atmosphere that puts those men
at ease! 0. . . After this research, I would probably lean to the
13
latter."

130.
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